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Introduction 
The January 2007 front-cover of the popular magazine 
Hist01y Today carried the catchy title 'Keeping Turkey 
out of Europe' .1 It was a clever editorial tactic that 
was meant to play upon its readers' sensibilities with 
regards to Turkish membership of the European 
Union, while creating a link with the Great Siege of 
1565. This publication is one of the latest in a long 
chain of such narratives that are inspired by this epic 
tale of violence, religion and heroism.1 Identifying 
the motives that led the Ottomans to besiege Malta 
is analogous to the analysis of an intricate work of 
tapestry. It is never easy to undertake the analysis of 
an event through the eyes of someone else, especially 
if the 'Other' is essentially different from you. To 
look at the Siege of 1565 from the Ottomans' point of 
view, and to gain an understanding of their motives, 
is an exercise in jumping the fence. One has to try to 
move beyond the categories of 'Maltese', 'Christian' 
and 'victors' (which ideas are ingrained in practically 
every Maltese from the most tender age), to the state 
of mind of' Ottoman', 'Muslim', and 'the vanquished'. 
An understanding of Hospitaller Malta is intimately 
tied to an understanding of the Ottoman Empire, its 
sworn enemy, and its reason for existence, at one and 
the same time. Finally, this is made more difficult by 
the fact that Ottoman archives have not been open to 
researchers for quite a long time and even now there 
is a whole set of logistical problems, especially the 
archaic language of the documents, which even modem 
Turkish researchers find difficult. 3 
The Mediterranean was the arena where a constant 
struggle between two great Empires - Spanish and 
Ottoman - unfolded. Both Empires were structured 
on strong religious foundations. In the East lay the 
Ottoman Empire under Suleiman the Magnificent 
(1520-1566), sprawling over the Balkan Peninsula, 
Two stamps from a set issued in 1965 to 
commemorate 400 years from the Great Siege of 
Malta designed by Chev. Emvin Cremona - the 
Tnrkish army arrives in Malta (top) and the 
Maltese forces fighting during one of 
the battles of the Siege (bottom) 
Asia Minor and most of the Arab world. In the West 
lay the Spanish Empire under Philip II (1527 -1598): 
"The two halves of the sea each supported its own 
system of trade rivalry and conquest" 4 Against this 
backdrop, Malta featured quite predominantly in the 
1 See the front-cover of Hist01y Today, 57/1 (2007) and the article by T. Rothman, 'The Great Siege of Malta', 12-9. 
2 On the many accounts and books that deal with the Great Siege of Malta see S.C. Spiteri, The Great Siege: Knights vs Turks mdlxv (Malta, 
2005), 'Introduction'. This book is the most detailed modern analysis of the military aspects of the Siege. For some recent important insights 
into the Great Siege see the various contributions in G. Cassar (ed.), The Great Siege !565: Separating Fact from Fiction (Malta, 2005). 
3 A. Cassola (ed.), The 1565 Ottoman Malta Campaign Register (Malta, 1998), 11. 
4 P. Padfield, Tide of Empire: Decisive Naval Campaigns in the Rise of the West. Vol.!. 1481-1654 (London, 1979), 87, as cited in V. Mallia-
Milanes & L.J. Scerri (eds.), An Uneasy Partnership: Malta 1530-1565 (Malta, 1985), 20. 
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Mediterranean order of things. Its position between 
Italy and Africa made it the object of dispute between 
Christians and Muslims, particularly as pressure 
intensified from both sides to assert effective control 
over North Africa along the course of the sixteenth 
century.' Hence, the Great Siege of Malta of 1565 can 
only make sense and be properly appreciated when 
it is viewed as part of a chain of conflicts stretching 
from the late fifteenth century to the third quarter of 
the sixteenth' (see Table 1). 
Such a list is not meant to be exhaustive or 
complete, but it does hammerin the point that the Siege 
of 1565 was part of a wider palimpsest of conflicts 
across the Western-Central Mediterranean region. 
These engagements tended to be characterized by a 
high level of volatility in terms· of their achievements: 
nothing could be taken for granted because what was 
conquered today could easily be lost tomorrow. There 
has tended to be an assumption that if Malta had 
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fallen into Ottoman hands, it would have done so for 
good. However, such a supposition - theoretical as it 
may be- does not hold sway when considered within 
this pattern of warfare. Moreover, the need of the 
Ottomans to have Malta as a base from which to attack 
southern Europe is reduced - though not completely 
discounted - when one observes the regularity with 
which incursions into European territories occurred. 
Between 1543 and 1544 the Ottoman fleet was even 
able to drop anchor in the harbour ofToulon.7 Hence, 
the reasons that determined the sizeable Ottoman 
investment in the Siege of Malta are to be found in 
the interstices between the short-term and long-term 
factors that shaped Ottoman policies and Christian-
Muslim relations in the Mediterranean. 
Long-term factors 
The Ottoman Turks rose as warriors in the Anatolian 
marches of the decaying Byzantine Empire. Their 
5 J. Riley-Smith, Hospitallers: The History of the Order o[St John (London, 1999), 106. 
6 List compiled from F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and llfediterranean World in the Age ofPhilip 11, ii (Berkeley, Calif., 1995; first edn. 1949; 
second edn. 1966), 967; Riley-Smith, 106-7; D. Cutajar & C. Cassar, 'Malta and the Sixteenth'Century Struggle for the Mediterranean', in 
Cassar (ed.), The Great Siege 1565 ... , 1-34; List of Ottoman sieges and landings from the fourteenth century to World War One, 
htto://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of Ottoman siege.<i and landings [last accessed 4.v.2008]. 
7 J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620 (Stroud, 1998; first published London, 1985), 16. 
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leaders, the sultans, adopted a gaza (Holy War) dogma 
as the comerstone of their identity and they extended 
the concept of gaza to bring the whole Islamic world 
under their protection. 8 The claims to universal empire 
by the Ottomans had their foundation in the will of 
God, but they were also based on the concept of the 
justice of conquest. God had imposed on Muslims 
the duty to propagate Islam and the Koran adjured 
believers "not [to] think that those who were slain in 
the cause of Allah are dead. They are alive and well 
provided for by Allah ... ".' Therefore, warfare was a 
central organising principle in Ottoman society and 
politics. The core of the Turkish army was composed 
of the Janissaries and Sipahis of the Parte- an elite 
group of highly trained and effective soldiers and 
cavalrymen. However, the bulk of the regular anny was 
formed from holders of the timars (military fiefs), who 
had either to serve personally or provide a number of 
horsemen according to the size of the fief. In contrast 
to feudalism in Europe, these fiefs were not hereditary 
in the holder's family, but were redistributed after the 
holder's death. In consequence, this class had a vested 
interest in constantly pushing the frontiers ofthe empire 
outwards in order to provide more land and timars for 
distribution. In particular, those holding timars on the 
islands of the Aegean served in the Ottoman navy. 10 
The Maltese islands would have probably fitted well 
within this system, thereby placing them in the logic 
of Ottoman conquest and sustenance. 
In early modem times, religion, politics and war were 
in effect a continuum rather than constituting separate 
spheres. It is therefore both difficult and somewhat 
anachronistic to try to split these up when analysing the 
factors that led to the Siege of 1565. Sultan Suleiman I 
seems to have harboured a deep antipathy for Emperor 
Charles V (1500-1558). He refused to recognize the 
latter's right to the title of emperor, acknowledging 
him only as King of Spain, and encouraged any force 
which opposed Charles' claim to sovereignty over the 
whole of westem Christendom. n In fact, according 
to El ton " ... Ottoman imperialism was probably 
the largest single factor in the consolidation and 
legitimisation ofProtestant Lutheranism and after 1526 
all the major concessions to it were connected with 
Ottoman activities in eastem and central Europe" .1' 
Contemporary sources portray Suleiman as a religious 
and conscientious man. According to a Greek knight 
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Suleiman the Magnificent, Sultan of the Ottoman 
Empire (Painting attributed to Titian c.l530) 
and spy in Constantinople, Suleiman's favourite wife· 
never ceased inciting her husband and urging the 
Ulemas to impress upon him that the total destruction of 
Malta was a matter of conscience, because the ships of 
the Order interfered with the pilgrimages to tl1e tomb of 
the Prophet at Mecca. 13 The lmam of the Great Mosque 
reminded the Sultan that the dungeons of Malta were 
full of Turkish captives whilst other sons oftlie Prophet 
were being lashed to the benches of Christian galleys to 
work on tllese sea craft which raided the sea routes of 
his own Empire. "It is only thy unconquerable sword", 
the Imarn cried, " ... that can break the chains of these 
poor creatures, subjects of thine, whose cries rise to 
heaven and afflict the ears of the Prophet himself ... 
all of them wait. .. upo~ thy justice and power, and 
thy vengeance upon their enemies - their implacable 
enemies who are thine also". 14 
8 H. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire- The Classical Age 1300-1600 (London, 1973), 57. 
· 9 G.Q. Bowler, H. G. Koeningsberger & G.L. Mosse, Europe in the Sixteenth Centwy (2nd edn., London, 1989), 242. 
10 Bowler et al., 246; J.H. Kramers, 'Sulaiman 1', in M.T. Houtsma et al. (eds.), First Encyclopedia of Islam 1913- 1936, ii (Leiden, 1987; reprint 
of 1" edn.), 525. · 
11 Inalcik, 58. 
12 As quoted in J.M. Rogers & R.M. Ward, Suleyman the Magnificent (London, 1988), 6. 
l3 F. Balbi di Correggio, The Siege of Malta 1565, (trans. Copenhagen, 1961), 32. 
14 E. Bradford, The Shield and the Sword: The Knights of Malta (UK, 1972), 145. 
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Short-term factors 
Having considered these long-term factors or patterns, it 
is necessary to identifY what the short-te1m issues were 
which, within these wider parameters, brought events 
to a head. The decision to launch an attack- when and 
where- was determined both by the choices of the key 
persons holding some form of political sway at the time, 
and by broader social and environmental dynamics. 
The timing of the Ottoman thrust was embedded in 
the rhythm of Mediterranean sea-warfare, the logic 
of which may have been more apparent to sixteenth-
century combatants than to modem historians; thus, on 
all sides there seems to have been the expectation that 
1565 would see a showdown. As for the target of the 
Ottomans' attack, Malta was, logistically, the furthest 
land which a massive naval squadron or fleet launched 
from Constantinople could effectively assail." 
The primary objective ofSuleiman was to dislodge 
the Hospitallers from Malta because of the great 
damage that was being done to Ottoman shipping." The 
decision to attack Malta was taken on 6 October 1564. 
Richard Knolles recorded Suleiman's speech to his 
war council. It is not a verbatim report but it expresses 
the motives of the Turkish campaign against Malta: 
"You yourselves·· daily hear the pitiful complaints of 
our subjects and merchants, whom the Maltese, I say 
not soldiers, but pirates ... spoil and make prizes of, 
whose injuries to revenge, all laws but of God and men 
do require" .17 The importance of securing Ottoman 
shipping lines is heightened when one keeps present 
the vitality of the yearly Alexandria-Istanbul caravan to 
the Ottoman economy and how its disturbance affected 
adversely the Porte's finances. Moreover, the audacious 
exploits of many knights in the waters of the Greek 
islands further infuriated Suleiman.18 
In Knolles' book we find that the chief instigators 
were Cassenes, son ofBarbarossa and King of Algiers, 
and Dragut, Governor of Tripoli, both of whom had 
their own reasons for wanting to deal a shattering 
blow to the Order who was harassing their territories 
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Ottoman Janissaries attacking the Knights in 
another siege against the Order of St John -
the Siege of Rhodes, 1522 
and disrupting their maritime trade. 19 Braudel also 
points out how the presence of the Knights in Malta 
and Tripoli was a constant threat to the vital line of 
communications with Barbary. It was essential to halt 
the Knight's transfer from Malta to Tripoli; which 
they in fact did. It was thus logical that the next target 
would be Malta.20 However, beneath this immediate 
aim, the inspiration of gaza and the need of new land 
to keep the timar system going, were also crucial 
factors. Thus, the attack on Malta in 1565 was deeply 
embedded in the wider framework of how the Ottoman 
Empire functioned. Then, when the Hospitallers 
scored a number ofhigh-profile naval successes in the 
months before the Siege of 1565 -which included the 
enslavement of prominent figures such as an important 
Ottoman lady and the Sanjaz-Bey of Alexandria, and 
the capture of rich cargoes - this only hardened the 
resolve of the Ottomans to attack.21 
Suleirnan- a life-long conqueror- seems to have 
viewed the subjugation of Malta as part of a wider 
15 J. F. Guilmartinjr, Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Waifare at Sea in the Sixteenth Centwy (Cambridge, 
1974), 176-8. 
16 V. Mallia-Milanes, 'Fnl Jean de La Valette 1495- 1568: A Reappraisal', in T. Cortis (ed.), The Maltese Cross (Malta, 1995), 124. 
17 J. Galea, 'The Great Siege of Malta from a Turkish Point ofView', Meliia Historica, iv/2 (1965), 112. 
18 Bradford, 141. 
19 Galea; Riley-Smith, 108; R. Abbe de Vertot, The History of the Knights of Malta (London, 1728), [Malta, 1989], ii, 190. 
20 Braudel, The Mediterranean ... , 918-9, 1014. 
21 On the controversy over the identity of this prominent lady see Balbi di Correggio, 31. See also A. Cassola, The 1565 Great Siege of Malta 
and Hip6lito SansS 'La Maltea' (Malta, 1999), 75: In Hip6iito Sans's poem La Maltea this woman, Giansevere, whom Romegas took back 
26 
as prisoner to Malta, is described as "Y tntxo as si con el a Malta presa/ una nobile senora poderosa,/1/amada Giansevere, de la mesa/de 
Solyman participe copiosa" [Canto I, f.Ilr.]. Hence, these verses suggest that she was the Sultan's lover. However, in Balbi's account of the 
Greek Knight's report, Giansevere is a hundred years old, which practically eradicates the possibility of her being Suleiman's lover. It seems 
more plausible that she was Ali Pasha's aunt or tl,le nurse of his favourite wife. On the other losses suffered by Ottoman shipping, cf. Bradford, 
142. 
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plan involving the whole ofitaly: "It is my great desire 
to capture Malta not for its own sake, bnt because of 
other and greater enterprises which will follow this 
expedition if it be successful"." A 'domino theory', to 
borrow a Cold War phrase, can be applied to Ottoman 
expansion. Being primarily a land-power, it expanded 
in this way, in a domino-like fashion, until it found 
strong points like Vienna and Malta, which halted its 
expansion in Europe. The empire had reached its limits. 
·At thousands of kilometres from its base the mighty 
Ottoman anny could be held np for vital weeks by the 
determined resistance of a small fortress like Malta.23 
On the other hand, the amount of documentation in 
Istanbul about the siege does not justifY the idea that 
the Great Siege was more extraordinary than any other 
Ottoman military campaign. Nonetheless, this does not 
detract from the importance given to it at the time by 
Suleiman who chose some of the best men to lead the 
expedition, such as Mustapha as Commander of the 
Anny, Piall as Commander of the Fleet, and Dragut; 
though the first two proved incapable of working 
together. The expeditionary force assembled was huge 
and it included a third of the Janissary corps. Just a 
glimpse at one detail- some 60,000 bullets were shot 
by the Ottomans at the defenders- gives an indication 
of the size of the enemy sent against Malta.24 
The speedy arrival in Malta of the Ottoman fleet 
on 18 May 1565 "hit Europe like a hurricane" whose 
consequences made it one of the great events of the 
century." The Great Siege of Malta has been hailed as 
"the Verdun of the sixteenth century", "the Stalingrad 
of its age" and "one of the three greatest events of the 
century"." Voltaire even said that "nothing is more 
famous in histor:y than the Siege ofMalta".27 That the 
Siege acquired such magnitude is more a testimony to 
the effectiveness of the Order in promoting its victory, 
than to its actual long-term impact on Mediterranean 
and European developments. A multitude of poems in 
Latin and in vernacular languages were composed and 
published in praise of the Knights. One poem described 
how "The Soldiers of CHRIST, who are also his sons; 
voluntarily opened up their hearts to receive death".28 
There were also many publications that combined 
22 Balbi di Correggio, 35. 
23 Cf. Bowler et al., 24 7. 
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The Monument commemorating 
the Great Siege of Malta found in modern day 
Republic Streetin Valletta -
a symbol of Maltese nnity and patriotism 
cartographic and other elements that helped to spread 
even further knowledge aboutthe Hospitallers' victory; 
these formed part of the wider genre of 'war-news' that 
was so popular across Europe.29 Through a combination 
of textual and pictorial mediums the Hospitallers 
forged an impressive and lasting legacy of themselves 
24 F. Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life 1400- 1800 (London, 1973), 294-5. 
25 Braudel, The Mediterranean ... , 1014 .. 
26 J. Godechot, Histoire de Matte (Paris, 1962), 45; M. Fontenay, 'Le developpement t.irbain du port de Malte du XVI• au XVIII• sif:cle', in 
REMMM, 71 [Le carrefour maltais], (1994) 1, 96; Braudel, La Miditerranie ... , 319. These three references are as cited in A. Brogini, Malte, 
FrontiJre de Chrktiente (1530-1670) (Rome, 2006), 176. 
27 G. Scarabelli, Catalogue of the Records of the Order ofSt John of Jerusalem in the National Librmy of Malta- Volume XIII Archives 1952-1953 
(Rome, 2004), !04, n.4l. · 
28 A. Boselli, 'Poesie latine e italiane per l'assedio di Malta', in Archivum Melitense, ill (1910), 79: "I Militi di CHRISTO, efigli suoi; Aprirono a 
morte vo!untaria i cuori". 
29 T. Vel!a, 'The 1565 Great Siege Frescoes in the Palace, Valletta', in M. Camilleri & T. Vella (eds.), Celebratio Amicitiae: Essays in Honour of 
Giovanni Bonello (Malta, 2006), 193-205. 
§acra milttia 
as defenders of Europe and martyrs of the faith. Their 
emphasis on martyrdom fitted within a wider European 
context of an age characterised by religious wars and 
missionary activity, which in turn made martyrdom as 
an iconographical subject very popular.30 
Conclusion 
The Ottoman siege of Malta was primarily concerned 
with dislodging the Hospitallers to halt their maritime 
activities and not with the conquest of Malta itself. 
It was also intimately tied to Suleiman's personal 
inclination to conclude what he perceived to be the 
unfinished business of Rhodes in 1522. With the 
demise of Suleiman in 1566, different concerns came 
to dominate Ottoman politics as the configurations 
of power and interests shifted. Keeping in mind the 
vicissitudes of the Ottoman Empire, the roles and 
decisions of contemporary great men and women, 
and the wider socio-economic and environmental 
constraints within which people operated, help one 
to better assess~· and understand the significance of 
why the Ottomans besieged Malta in 1565. 
The defeat suffered by the Ottomans in Malta 
was exceptional and for Europeans living at the time, 
from Rome to London, it certainly felt like something 
good and worth celebrating.31 In psychological terms, 
Western Europe was united in fear of the Ottoman 
Empire that stretched from the Persian Gulfto Austria, 
so that its defeat in Malta was certainly welcome. 
However, from the long-term perspective - and quite 
probably soon after 1565 - it is clear that although 
Malta represented an epic defeat for the Ottomans, it 
did not curtail their power.32 In terms of the balance 
of power in the Mediterranean, the Siege of Malta did 
not particularly affect things; but as regards the Order 
and Malta, it signalled the commencement of a new 
forward-looking and confidence-filled era.33 
Just as in Maltese history 1565 is the 'Great Siege', 
so in Turkish history Suleirnan is the 'Lawgiver', 
whose reign is remembered as a golden age and an 
absolute reference point." The significance that 
1565 still holds in the Maltese national psyche is 
encapsulated in the Great Siege Monument in Valletta 
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(inaugurated in May 1927). In spatial terms it lies 
at the heart of the capital city; in cultural terms the 
8 September celebrations hold pride of place in the 
national calendar. In the wake of the EUFA Euro-
2008 football match between Malta and Turkey of 
8 September 2007, a ·number of images of Maltese 
supporters dressed in black shirts with the white 
eight-pointed cross printed on their chests appeared 
in various newspapers and online. Such pictures 
possessed an evocative feel to them as they confirm 
the pervasive way in which the past continues to 
impinge on perceptions of the present. The Great 
Siege of 1565 may not have been the earth-shaking 
event it was once thought to be, but in cultural terms 
its memory has proved to be a powerful moulding 
force in Maltese consciousness and identity. 
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